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BOOK REVIEW
Edited by Ralph Nader and Mark Green.
New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1976. Pp. xviii, 323. $10.00.

VERDICTS ON LAWYERS.

Reviewed by Ted Finman*
Verdicts on Lawyers consists of twenty-three essays written by
twenty-five authors,' most of them attorneys. The purpose of this
compilation is to promote reform by (1) noting and describing deficiencies in the behavior of lawyers, in the structure and organization
of the legal profession, and in rules and mechanisms that affect the
distribution of legal services to poor and middle-class clienteles and
(2) prescribing remedies for the problems noted.
Because the editors and many of the contributors have devoted
much of their time and energy to promoting social reform, a question arises concerning the evaluative framework that should be used
in appraising this book. Reform-minded writers and editors can play
different roles, and the criterion that should be used in appraising
their work depends on what they purport to be doing.
One role is that of propagandist for a cause. Here the writer's
loyalty and obligation run to the cause, not to the reader. Readers
understand this, however; they expect polemical works to be onesided, exaggerated, highly biased presentations containing statements, innuendos, and arguments that must be taken with an appropriate grain of salt. Consequently, the crusading polemicist
should not be criticized for lacking objectivity unless his or her work
falls below minimal standards of honesty and rationality.
Writers, of course, usually present themselves not as polemicists but as searchers after truth, social critics who, despite their
own convictions, recognize that their primary obligation is to educate and inform their audience rather than to convert it. Even such
writers hope to convince their readers and certainly are entitled to
argue vigorously for a point of view. Nonetheless, they should present the facts fully and fairly; disclose the difficulties in their arguments; and examine not only the beneficial but also the possibly
harmful consequences of proposed remedies. Although this is an
ideal seldom if ever realized, it constitutes the appropriate standard
* Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. A.B., University of Chicago, 1950; LL.B.,
Stanford University, 1954.
1. The volume also contains an introduction by co-editor Ralph Nader.
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for appraising work that purports to be not propaganda but rational,
objective social criticism.
What standard should be used to appraise Verdicts on
Lawyers? The editors are well-known consumer advocates interested in whether producers of goods and services give fair value to
their customers, in exposing those who do not, and in promoting
reforms that will protect consumer interests. It would be unreasonable, therefore, to fault them or their authors for focusing on the
shortcomings of lawyers and neglecting the many ways in which the
bar contributes to the welfare of society. Moreover, it is reasonable
and proper for the editors to present inequities in ways that will
elicit a sympathetic, emotional response from the reader. This does
not mean, however, that Verdicts on Lawyers can reasonably be
viewed or evaluated as propaganda. This book, after all, is not a
tract given away free on street corners or sold for a pittance at
political meetings. Purchasers must pay a substantial price for the
book and therefore are justified in assuming that Verdicts on
Lawyers is designed to fill their need for reliable information and
reasoned analysis rather than to serve the ideological ends of its
editors. This expectation is reinforced by Nader's introduction,
which refers to scholarly studies and well-known professors of law,
uses phrases like "realistically appraised" and "evaluation" to characterize the essays that follow, and tells the reader that the
"gathering of facts and judgments in this book can help illuminate
the tangible horizons of the profession."' 2 Within the essays themselves, footnote references to books, articles, judicial decisions, and
other authorities suggest the exercise of a certain degree of care and
objectivity.3 In short, since Verdicts on Lawyers appears to be a
book on which readers can rely for accurate data and balanced
analyses,4 it should be evaluated as such, not as a political polemic.
Certainly its editors would agree. Do not Messrs. Nader and Green
champion the view that conscientious producers should be sensitive
to the needs and expectations of consumers? Do not purchasers and
readers of books, no less than those who buy automobiles or hire
2.
cited as
3.

VERDICTS ON LAWYERS,
VERDICTS].

at viii-ix, xviii (R. Nader & M. Green eds. 1976) [hereinafter

Rather than accompany the text of each article, the footnotes are collected in

VERDICTS,

supra note 2, at 307-23.

4. Some readers may have different expectations. Viewing lawyers and legal institutions as part of a basically evil and corrupt system and accepting co-editor Nader's reputation
as a foe of the establishment, these readers may look to Verdicts on Lawyers not for education
but for comfort and support. Although the essays do not always provide such solace, these
readers may well get their money's worth.
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lawyers, have interests as consumers?
In analyzing their value to readers, I have divided the essays
into four categories: (1) those that make a significant contribution
to the existing literature; (2) those that in the main restate information and ideas readily available elsewhere; (3) those that in my
judgment are so flawed that they detract from the book; and (4)
those that seem to me irrelevant to the book's purposes.5

I.
One essay, Jack Newfield's "The Ten Worst Judges,"I contributes significantly to the literature. On the assumption that publicity
concerning reprehensible judicial conduct might help deter such
behavior and contribute to development of a better system for dealing with unfit judges, Newfield presents sketches of "the ten worst"
New York City judges. The presentation is well researched: the
author read "more than one hundred court transcripts and interviewed more than fifty trial lawyers . . . [and] judges, court officers and stenographers, prosecutors, cops, members of judicial
screening committees, and other journalists who cover the courts." 7
He selected his ten subjects from a list of twenty-two who had been
5. I have chosen not to devote full treatment in the text to this group of essays. Riley's
"The Mystique of Lawyers," VERDIMTS, supra note 2, at 80-93, is a disjointed series of simplistic statements about law and lawyers. Riley really seems to express dissatisfaction with
society generally rather than simply with legal institutions. This impression is confirmed by
his last paragraph. If, as I assume, the purpose of Verdicts on Lawyers is to explore not social
inequities inherent in the basic structure of society or in human nature itself, but problems
endemic to the legal profession and legal institutions, Riley's essay is irrelevant.
The other irrelevant essay is Judge Justice C. Ravitz's "Reflections of a Radical Judge:
Beyond the Courtroom." Id. at 255-68. This essay is billed by co-editor Nader as a "forthright description of a municipal court." Id. at xi. Because most of Judge Ravitz's essay is
essentially a statement of his credo as a radical judge, Nader's characterization is not quite
accurate. The author begins with a rather traditional polemic against American society and
its legal institutions. Id. at 255-59. He then describes the campaign that led to his election
to the Detroit municipal bench, explains why it is not a "contradiction for a radical to be a
judge," and describes how a radical judge should behave. Id. at 265-68. He relates two cases
in which he adopted a rather unorthodox but interesting approach to corporate misconduct.
Id. at 260-61. All of this tells us much about Judge Ravitz but little about his court. The only
part of the essay that does focus on the Detroit municipal bench as such is the three-page
section on the efforts of Judge Ravitz and a colleague to reform the criminal arraignment
process. Because only that brief portion relates to the stated purpose of Verdicts on Lawyers,
the essay is irrelevant in my opinion. Considered on its own and apart from Verdicts on Lawyers and disregarding the hackneyed polemics, Judge Ravitz's essay is fairly interesting.
6. Newfield, The Ten Worst Judges, in VERDIMTS, supra note 2, at 269-84. For substantially the same essay, see Newfield, The Next Ten Worst Judges, or The Ten Worst Judges
of 1974, VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 26, 1974, at 5, and Newfield, The Ten Worst Judges, NEw YORK,
Oct. 16, 1972, at 32.
7. Newfield, in VERDICTS, supra note 2, at 271.
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"'recommended' by five or more people interviewed as standing for
cruelty, stupidity, bias against the poor, short tempers, or total
'8
insensitivity to civil liberties."
In one sense, of course, there is nothing new in what Newfield
has to say. At the analytic level-as an abstraction-the meaning
of "bad judge" and the fact that some members of the judiciary fall
into this category are well understood. Most people, however, have
not experienced a "bad judge," and this is an important gap in their
understanding. Without experiential knowledge, they cannot really
appreciate what bad judges mean to the people whose lives they
directly affect, and without that appreciation they lack data that
bear importantly on how much of society's resources should be allocated to solving this problem. It is one thing to understand the
definition of pain, quite another to feel it. As with pain, understanding the meaning of "bad judge" at the level of feeling gives one a
deeper appreciation of the need for a remedy than does analytic
knowledge alone.
Newfield's vivid sketches of New York's worst promotes this
appreciation. Through excerpts from transcripts of judicial proceedings he opens the door to the courtroom so that readers can see and
feel what is happening inside. This will be new knowledge for most,
a refresher course for some, and important for all.
Newfield deserves credit not only for saying something important but also for the responsible, careful way in which he says it.
His presentation easily could have created the impression that his
subjects are typical and, indeed, that their presence on the bench
is part of a grand conspiracy by which one segment of society oppresses the rest. Whatever else may be said in defense of these
views, Newfield's data do not support them, and therefore to imply
the contrary would violate an author's obligation to his or her readers. No such violation occurs in Newfield's work. Indeed, he takes
care to avoid misinterpretation of his data. Early in his essay he tells
his readers that "[t]here are good judges and bad judges; the good
ones approximate justice, in spite of the system's inhibitions", and
warns that focusing on ten individuals is "a journalistic device that
simplifies and personalizes." 10 After depicting the bad judges, Newfield again notes that "there are many good judges."'
8. Id. at 272.
9. Id. at 271.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 283.
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II.
Fifteen of the essays in Verdicts on Lawyers deal with topics
and present materials that would be quite familiar to persons acquainted with the literature available before the book's publication."2 Seven are concerned with rules regulating the legal profession, the delivery of legal services to poor and middle-class clienteles, and the interrelationships between the two.13 Two discuss the
roles played by lawyers and bar associations in promoting the selection of competent judges." Six are concerned with lawyers' behavior-two with what should be done to protect against misbehavior,'
and four with what business and government lawyers should do
when the desires of their clients clash with the public interest."8
12. In at least seven instances, the essays in Verdicts on Lawyers previously had been
published elsewhere in substantially the same form. These prior publications are cited in note
6 supra and notes 13 & 49 infra. Given the concern of the editors of Verdicts on Lawyers for
consumer information, I find a bit curious their failure to mention, in all but one instance,
these prior publications.
13. Conyers, Undermining Poverty Lawyers, in VERDICTS, supra note 2, at 129-43;
Freedman, Advertisingand Soliciting: The Case for Ambulance Chasing, id. at 94-104 (taken

from M.

FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM

(1975) (prior publication

acknowledged)); Halpern, The Public Interest Bar: An Audit, id. at 158-71 (for substantially
the same essay, see Halpern, Public Interest Law: Its Past and Future, 58 JUDICATURE 118
(1974)); Hochberg, The Drive to Specialization, id. at 118-26; Lieberman, How to Avoid
Lawyers, id. at 105-17; Lorenz, State of Siege: Group Legal Services for the Middle Class,
id. at 144-57; Tunney & Frank, Epilogue: A CongressionalRole in Lawyer Reform?, id. at
295-304 (for substantially the same piece, see Tunney & Frank, Federal Roles in Lawyer
Reform, 27 STAN. L. REV. 333 (1975). For passages from and references to commentary on the
topics covered in these essays published prior to Verdicts on Lawyers, see V. COUNTRYMAN,
T. FINMAN, & T. SCHNEYER, THE LAWYER IN MODERN SOCIETY 51-60, 625-32 (2d ed. 1976)
(public interest law practice) [hereinafter cited as COUNTRYMAN]; id. at 568-606 (legal services for the poor); id. at 606-25 (group legal services and other matters relating to legal services
for the middle class); id. at 433-36, 442-47 (advertising, solicitation, and publicity); id. at 76695 (specialization, certification, and continuing legal education); id. at 518-19, 625 (reducing
legal costs by increasing lawyer efficiency; paraprofessionals).
14. MacKenzie, Of Judges and the ABA, in VERDICTS, supra note 2, at 33-46; Schmidt,
Lawyers on Judges: Competence and Selection, id. at 285-94. For passages from and references to commentary on these subjects published prior to Verdicts on Lawyers, see
COUNTRYMAN,

supra note 13, at 653-95.

15. Clark, Crisis at Justice, in VERDICTS, supra note 2, at 219-30; Garbus & Seligman,
Sanctions and Disbarment: They Sit in Judgment, id. at 47-60. Clark offers a long list of
proposals, most of which have been discussed in a wide range of forums. For passages from
and references to materials on the inadequacies of the process for disciplining lawyers, see
COUNTRYMAN, supra note 13, at 811-20, 836-38.
16. Califano, The Washington Lawyer: When to Say No, in VERDICTS, supranote 2, at
187-69; Pertschuk, The Lawyer-Lobbyist, id. at 197-207; Rabinowitz, The Prosecutor: The
Duty to Seek Justice, id. at 231-41; Smyser, In-House Corporate Counsel: The Erosion of
Independence, id. at 208-16. For passages from and references to materials on the subjects of
these essays, see COUNTRYMAN, supra note 13, at 270-75, 293-94, 302-07 (behavior of lawyers
representing large corporate clients, especially in dealing with Congress and federal agencies);
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These essays are both informational and programmatic. They
describe inequities and deficiencies in the legal system and in the
profession, explore past reform efforts, and advocate adoption of
specific new reforms. Unfortunately, they add very little to what
7
already was available.'
Thus the value of these essays will depend on the audience.
Those who have more than a passing interest in the legal profession
and who have pursued the literature to any significant extent will
find little that is new or interesting. As a primer for uninformed
readers who want to obtain some elementary education with a minimum of effort, however, these fifteen essays constitute a useful
collection and serve an important function. I should stress that this
is my judgment of the fifteen as a collection. Individually, they vary
substantially in quality. Some are very well done-accurate, balanced, insightful-and even readers who intend to delve more
deeply will find them useful as a starting point." Others, although
they seem to me on balance to weigh out positively, have serious
deficiencies.
One deficiency is the failure to refer readers to other material
through which they might broaden and deepen their understanding.
For example,'" MacKenzie's essay on the role of the ABA in the
selection of judges " fails to cite (a) the major work on this subject,2 '
(b) helpful material on judicial appointments during the Johnson
Administration,2 2 a period which saw significant changes in the
ABA's role (changes the author does not note), or (c) scholarly articles exploring the Haynsworth and Carswell Supreme Court nominations.23 Lapses of this sort, of course, are significant only to readid. at 245-49 (responsibilities of prosecutors); id. at 46-51 (responsibilities of other government
lawyers); id. at 41-46 (in-house corporate counsel).
17. For references to previously available materials, see notes 13-16 supra.
18. Charles Halpern's "The Public Interest Bar: An Audit," VmIcrs, supra note 2,
at 158-71, is an exellent summary of the emergence of public interest law practice and the
problems it faces in the future. See also Lieberman, supra note 13, at 105-17; Schmidt, supra
note 14, at 285-94.
19. Another striking example is Mama Tucker's failure in her essay "Pro Bono ABA?,"
VERDICTS, supra note 2, at 20-33, to cite Brickman, Legal Delivery Systems-A Bibliography,
4 U. TOL. L. Rav. 465 (1973), a detailed and comprehensive listing of materials on legal
services for the poor, the OEO program and its problems, group legal services, and so on. For
references to other writings on topics covered but left uncited by these essays, see notes 1316 supra.
20. MacKenzie, supra note 14.
21. The work referred to is Joel Grossman's Lawyers and Judges: The ABA and the
Politics of JudicialSelection (1965).
22. This material is contained in chapter 5 of Harold Chase's Federal Judges: The
Appointing Process (1972).
23. Grossman & Wasby, The Senate and Supreme Court Nominations: Some
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ers interested in further study. Two other flaws, however, are relevant both to such readers and to those who are likely to rely entirely
on Verdicts on Lawyers for their understanding of the problems it
addresses. Indeed, for such an audience these flaws are especially
serious, since the resulting misapprehensions are not likely to be
corrected.
The most serious and frequent flaw in this group of essays is the
failure to identify-not discuss, just identify-issues of which readers should be aware if they are to appreciate the difficulties and
complexities of the reforms advocated. Even if these essays are
viewed only as a basic primer, the authors should have noted questions that bear on the validity of their arguments and should have
indicated the costs that might be generated by their proposals and
the problems that might arise and need to be solved if those proposals were adopted.
In his essay on advertising and soliciting,24 Monroe Freedman
reviews the familiar arguments against the sweeping prohibitions
traditionally imposed on lawyers. He provides no suggestions, however, for dealing with the questions that arise once it is decided that
those rules should be modified. For example, what limits if any
should be imposed to protect the public against false advertising?
Should advertising be limited to certain specified information (e.g.,
information on fees), or should everything except "deceptive practices" be allowed? Although it may be desirable that lawyers offer
their services to persons who seem to have legal problems, how far
should lawyers go in seeking to convince reluctant litigants that
they really ought to sue?
Two essays urge increased use of paralegal personnel to reduce
the costs of handling what the authors call "routine transactions"
and "mechanical tasks." 5 No note is taken, however, of the risk that
paralegals, erroneously perceiving complex problems as "routine" or
"mechanical," will undertake to serve clients who really need a
lawyer's assistance. Are current systems by which lawyers supervise
paralegals sufficient to protect against this danger, or is the supervision too perfunctory? What should be done if paralegals eventually
form their own firms and serve the public directly without supervision by lawyers, a possibility that one author mentions in passing?26
Reflections, 1972 DUKE L.J. 557; Grossman & Wasby, Haynsworth & Parker:History Does
Live Again, 23 S.C.L. REv. 345 (1971).
24. Freedman, supra note 13.
25. Lieberman, supra note 13, at 114-15; Tunney & Frank, supra note 13, at 299.
26. Lieberman, supra note 13, at 115.
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After reviewing the lawlessness that riddled the Department of
Justice during the Nixon Administration, former Attorney General
Ramsey Clark proposes numerous measures to protect against future misconduct. 27 Second on his list is a proposal to prohibit the
President from filling Justice Department positions, including the
position of Attorney General, with persons who "participated significantly" in the President's campaign or who held "a high political
party position, or managed a campaign or.

.

. sought high political

office within two years" of a proposed appointment.? Several questions would have helped readers evaluate this proposal. Was the
lawlessness of Nixon's appointees due primarily to their prior participation in politics? Were not their political values at least as
important? Since active participation in politics sometimes reflects
a deep and genuine concern for the public interest, might more be
lost than gained by barring such persons from service in the Justice
Department?
Two essays, one by Joseph Califano and one by Michael Pertschuk, discuss the responsibilities of lawyers who lobby for business
clients to take account of the public interest. 29 Both argue, as many
have argued before, that important interests often go unrepresented
in the legislative arena; that therefore we cannot rely on the clash
of adversaries to provide the legislature with the full range of information and arguments needed for intelligent legislative decision
making; and that the responsibility of the lawyer-lobbyist voluntarily to disclose material adverse to a client's position therefore should
be greater than that of the courtroom advocate. This analysis is
useful as far as it goes, but readers would have been served far better
had it been carried a few steps further. A key question is whether
the duty to disclose should be legal or only ethical; that is, whether
those who violate the duty should be subject to legal sanctions. If
the obligation is legally binding, will clients speak freely with their
lawyers? If communication is impaired, will lawyers lose opportunities to dissuade clients from antisocial courses of action? If the duty
is only ethical, will it be meaningful? These and other important
questions arise once the distinction between legal and ethical duties
is recognized. Neither Califano nor Pertschuk makes this distinction, however. Indeed, it is not clear what position they take on
whether the lawyer's duty should be legal or ethical."
27.
28.
29.
30.

Clark, supra note 15, at 226-30.
Id. at 227.
Califano, supra note 16; Pertschuk, supra note 16.
For example, in discussing one problem Califano asks whether we should "impose"
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Another important question is what the Code of Professional
Responsibility says about the lawyer-lobbyist's duty to disclose.
Both Califano and Pertschuk mention the Code, but neither notes
the possible bearing of certain of the Code's Disciplinary Rules.
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(5) provides that a lawyer "shall not
knowingly make a false statement of law or fact," and rule 1102(A)(4) prohibits "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation." Presumably a lawyer who consciously makes a
false statement to a legislator would violate these rules. Beyond
this, suppose a lawyer is not certain that a statement is false, but
considers it highly dubious. Do lawyer-lobbyists implicitly represent
to legislators that they, the lawyers, believe their statements to be
true, or at least that they have no good reason to think them false?
If such representations are implicit, would the lawyer in the hypothetical case above have violated either or both of the quoted Disciplinary Rules? 3
Another serious deficiency in this group of essays is the presence of erroneous or incomplete statements that tend to misinform
readers on matters of some importance.
In his essay on group legal services, Jim Lorenz implies that the
bar has behaved in a morally bankrupt manner.3 2 As evidence of
this, he points to the restrictive rules adopted by the ABA House of
Delegates at its 1974 meeting in Houston, rules he characterizes as
"sleight-of-hand" by "ABA lawyers" involving "nothing more than
the exploitation of a new market at high rates unilaterally set by
lawyer trade associations. 33 He fails to mention that at this very
same meeting the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility proposed a set of liberalized rules on group
legal services; that the president of the ABA supported this proposal; and that the proposal lost by the relatively close vote of 117
to 144. 31 In 1975 the ABA did adopt liberalized rules. Lorenz exa higher "ethical standard." Califano, supra note 16, at 193. If "impose" means to require
by law, then the standard would be a legal one. If the standard is to be only "ethical," what
does "impose" mean? At another point he says "it is incumbent upon those [lawyers]
representing privileged dominant interests to assume a special measure of responsibility," but
then speaks as if he would require this by law. Id. at 194 (emphasis supplied).
31. See COUNTRYMAN, supra note 13, at 369-70 (suggesting that ABA Formal Opinion
No. 335 (1974), which overlooks the analysis presented above, incorrectly construed the Disciplinary Rules).
32. Lorenz, supra note 13.
33. Id. at 150.
34. For the House of Delegates action, see House of Delegates Act on Group Legal
Services, Shield Legislation, Court Organization Standards, and Uniform Divorce, 60
A.B.A.J. 446 (1974); for the text of the proposals, see A.B.A. SUMMARY AND REPORTS, 1974
MIDYEAR MEETING, Item

127.

1290

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:1281

plains this with the comment that the "bar finally saw the light
because it felt the heat."35 He overlooks the fact that much of the
heat came from within the bar itself." In brief, although some ABA
lawyers voted out of self-interest, others, including important members of the ABA establishment, were concerned with the public
welfare. Readers of Verdict on Lawyers, however, will see only one
side of this picture.
Jethro Lieberman's essay, "How to Avoid Lawyers," contains
the following passage:
Consider . . .the great Samuel Williston's withholding of evidence from the
other side on behalf of his client in a civil suit . . . .Had Williston been
condemned . . . any concern we might have had over the potentially dangerous course of professional ethics would be theoretical. Yet . . .he was not
condemned. Quite the reverse: His conduct was justified as the work of a
skilled advocate ably aiding his client by obscuring the issues."

This passage is misleading in two ways. First, some readers are
likely to interpret the phrase "withholding of evidence" to mean
active misconduct of some sort (e.g., refusing to comply with a
demand for discovery or purporting to do so but secretly concealing
a crucial piece of evidence). In fact, the ethics committee opinion
cited for the Williston story involved the failure of an attorney to
volunteer information adverse to his client's case.3" This is quite a
different matter, for although attorneys expect one another to respond honestly when discovery rules require that they speak, they
do not expect an adversary voluntarily to disclose material harmful
to the interests of a client. Thus a lawyer's failure to volunteer
information is not deceptive, although active concealment would
be. Second, the ethics committee did not approve the attorney's
35. Lorenz, supra note 13, at 151.
36. See, e.g., Statement of F.W. McCalpin, former chairman of the ABA Committee
on Prepaid Legal Services, to Senate Subcommittee on Representation of Citizens Interests,
inJusticeDepartmentand Other Views on PrepaidLegal Services Plans Get an Airing Before
the Tunney Subcommittee, 60 A.B.A.J. 791, 795 (1974).
37. Lieberman, supra note 13, at 110.
38. Lieberman's citation is as follows: "Opinion No. 309, in Opinionsof the Committee
on ProfessionalEthics (ABA, 1956)." This obviously is an error, since (a) ABA Opinion 309
has nothing whatsoever to do with the Williston story and (b) the volume containing ABA
Formal Opinion No. 309 was published in 1967, not 1956. Opinion No. 309 of the New York
County Bar Association is on point, and it appears in a volume published in 1956, namely
The Opinions of the Committees on ProfessionalEthics of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York and the New York County Lawyers'Association.New York County Opinion
309 considers whether a defense attorney acted improperly when he failed to disclose voluntarily that he knew of an eyewitness who could have provided vital testimony on plaintiff's
behalf. My discussion in text is based upon the assumption that Lieberman meant to cite
New York County Opinion 309.
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"aiding his client by obscuring the issues." It said that "[i]n the
opinion of the Committee the conduct of the defendant's attorney
is not professionally improper."39
In at least two respects, Monroe Freedman misdescribes the
rules and decisions concerning solicitation in his essay on this
topic. 0 Disciplinary Rule 2-104 generally bars lawyers who volunteer
advice to lay persons from accepting employment prompted by that
advice. Freedman claims that this rule is
practically meaningless-at least for a particular class of lawyers and
clients-because. . . Rule 2-104 provides further: "A lawyer [who has volunteered advice] may accept employment by a close friend, relative, [or a]
former client ...... This refinement means that those who are accustomed to
retain lawyers, say for their tax or4 estates work ... are the kind of people who
can be solicited despite the rule. '

He seems to reason as follows: (a) well-to-do people are likely to
have retained lawyers at some time in their lives; (b) thus they will
be within the former-client exception of rule 2-104; (c) therefore
lawyers are completely free to solicit the well-to-do. This ignores
other language in rule 2-104 that allows lawyers to accept employment resulting from advice given former clients only "if the advice
is germane to the former employment. 4 2 Instead of a blanket indulgence for rich clients, rule 2-104 actually provides for an exception of rather limited scope. Freedman later cites a provision of the
Code of ProfessionalResponsibility and an ABA ethics committee
opinion for the proposition that when a lawyer's motives for soliciting a client "are mixed . . . that is, when the attorney acts with
both a proper motive (to provide needed advice) and an 'improper'
motive (to obtain a fee)-it is the proper motive that is determinative,"43 and the solicitation, therefore, is proper. The authorities on
which he relies do not support this position. Ethical Consideration
2-3, he says, "does suggest that an attorney should not solicit a
39. THE OPINIONS OF THE COMMrTEEs ON PROFESSIONAL ETcs
OF THE AssocIATION OF THE
BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK AND THE NEW YORK CoumY LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION, No. 309

(1956).
40. Freedman, supra note 13.
41. Id. at 97.
42. Disciplinary Rule 2-104(A) reads as follows:
A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to a layman that he should obtain counsel or
take legal action shall not accept employment resulting from the advice, except that:
(1) A lawyer may accept employment by a close friend, relative, former client (if the
advice is germane to the former employment), or one whom the lawyer reasonably
believes to be a client.
43. Freedman, supra note 13, at 100.
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client solely for the purpose of obtaining a fee." 4 The implication
is that if the attorney has other worthy purposes, the solicitation
would be proper. In fact, the word "solely" does not appear in Ethical Consideration 2-3, which states without qualification that "a
lawyer should not contact a non-client. . . for the purpose of being
retained to represent him for compensation." The ethics committee
opinion Freedman quotes45 dealt with a situation in which attorneys
advertised both their opposition to certain legislation and their willingness to represent without compensation persons who believed
their constitutional rights were being violated by this legislation,
but who lacked the means to pay for legal services. In the passage
Freedman quotes, the committee held that lawyers, like other citizens, are entitled under the Constitution to express their views on
political issues and, to that end, may proclaim their views through
newspaper ads, even though such ads may promote the interests of
existing clients." In this portion of its opinion, the committee said
nothing about solicitation of clients. Consequently, to conclude
from the quoted passage, as the author does, that "even though an
attorney may receive compensation, the solicitation of a client is not
unethical if the client might otherwise have failed to vindicate his
or her legal rights"" is dubious at best. Freedman's error is especially surprising when one reads the second part of the committee's
opinion. It is there that the committee considers the portion of the
ad in which the lawyers offered their services to members of the
public. The committee held that because the lawyers were not seeking "remunerative business" but were offering only to represent
"indigent persons" without compensation, their advertisements did
not violate the Canons of Ethics." The committee made not the
slightest suggestion, however, that the Canons cited would be inapplicable to the solicitation of paying clients.
I.
Five essays in Verdicts on Lawyers are filled with deficiencies
that go not to peripheral matters but to the authors' principal
44. Id. at 100 (emphasis supplied).
45. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 148 (1935).
46. Id. at 417-18.
47. Freedman, supra note 13, at 100.
48. This language appears in the body of the ABA Opinion. The headnote preceding
the Opinion states: "It is not unethical for an attorney to broadcast . . . an offer, on behalf
of an organization of attorneys, to represent without charge any indigent person whose constitutional rights have been violated." ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics, OPINIONS, No. 148,
at 417 (1935).
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points." These essays are not simply marginally deficient; they are
fundamentally flawed. They are permeated by (1) erroneous statements of fact and miscitation of cases, (2) presentation of highly
debatable conclusions as if they were self-evident truths, and (3)
failure to alert readers to fundamental weaknesses in the conclusions advanced and in the arguments and premises on which those
conclusions rest. Consequently, uninformed or unsuspecting readers
are likely to accept without question centrally important points that
are at least highly debatable.
One theme common to these essays is that lawyers, bar associations, and in some respects the legal system itself behave on the
whole in an antisocial manner. Three essays accompany this criticism with proposals for reform. My critique of these essays should
not be construed as a blanket endorsement of the bar or the legal
system. Quite the contrary, I see many flaws and support many
reforms. My concern here, however, is not with the failings of lawyers but with whether the critics writing in Verdicts on Lawyers
present those failings to their readers in a fair and responsible manner.
Marna Tucker's thesis in "Pro Bono ABA?" 50 is that lawyers,
individually and collectively, have failed miserably to fulfill their
obligation to provide legal services for those who need but are unable to afford them. On the whole, she tells us, when the welfare of
the poor has conflicted with the interests of the bar, lawyers have
protected themselves and neglected the needy. Moreover, when the
bar has taken steps to make legal services more available, its actions
have been prompted by selfish, ignoble motives. Two questions
arise: Does the author correctly state the facts concerning the bar's
behavior? If so, is it responsible to present the judgment that such
behavior is reprehensible as if it were a self-evident truth?
Tucker's criticism is directed in part at the bar's reaction to the
legal aid movement and later to the legal services program of the
Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). Although she commends a
49. Green, The ABA as Trade Association, in VERDICTS, supra note 2, at 3-19 (for
substantially the same piece, see Green, The ABA: The Rhetoric Has Changed but the
Morality Lingers On, WASHINGTON MONTHLY, Jan. 1974, at 21) [hereinafter cited as Green,
TradeAssociation]; Green, The Gross Legal Product: "How Much Justice Can You Afford?,"
id. at 63-79 (for substantially the same piece, see M. Green, The High Cost of Lawyers, New
York Times, Aug. 10, 1975, § 8 (Magazine) at 8) [hereinafter cited as Green, Legal Product];
Moore & Harris, Class Actions: Let the People In, id. at 172-84; Morrison, Defending the

Government: How Vigorous is Too Vigorous?, id. at 242-52; Tucker, Pro Bono ABA?, id.
at 20-32 (for substantially the same piece, see Tucker, Pro Bono ABA?, 60 A.B.A.J. 916
(1974)).
50. Tucker, supra note 49, at 20-32.
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few lawyers for their contributions, she disparages the behavior of
the bar in general. She says, for example, that the bar maintained
a "continual watch over legal aid lawyers. Client income limits and
eligibilty standards discouraged the commercial practice of law
... . Charity was one thing, competition quite another."5 Certainly legal aid limited its clientele to persons whose income fell
below a certain level. These limits, however, are inherent in the very
idea of a program for the poor. Without such rules, the resources of
legal aid would have been available to anyone rather than only to
the client group least able to pay for legal services. Thus to attribute
legal aid's income-limitation rules to lawyer selfishness is to ignore
the primary reason for the creation and maintenance of those rules.
Tucker describes the reaction of lawyers to the federally funded
OEO legal service program as one of
relief that someone was assuming the burden of the profession's responsibility
to provide representation for the poor .... From the bar's perspective, the
major difference between legal aid of the 1920s and legal services of the 1960s
is that the latter shifted the financial obligation of legal representation of the
poor from the shoulders of the profession to the shoulders of the general tax52
payer.

Is it accurate to describe the feelings of lawyers in such uncomplimentary terms? Did OEO shift the financial burden, as Tucker
claims, so that lawyers might have had the feelings she ascribes to
them? The facts are revealing. First, in the years preceding the OEO
program about fifteen percent of the budget for legal aid came from
lawyers and bar associations. 3 Thus the burden to be shifted was a
relatively small one. Second, after OEO had started to fund legal
services, lawyers and bar associations contributed more dollars to
this effort, not less.54 It would be strange indeed if the bar felt
relieved of a burden which in fact was actually increasing.
Tucker's primary criticism is that the bar has failed to accept
the principle that each and every lawyer should provide free legal
51. Id. at 22.
52. Id. at 25.

53. The contribution was 15.32% in 1960, 14.49% in 1962, and 16.59% in 1965, the year
immediately prior to the influx of OEO funds. See NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER
AssoCiAnoN, 1961 SUMMARY OF CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 14; NLADA, 1963 SUMMARY OF CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 27; NLADA, 1966 SUMMARY OF CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 46.
54. The contribution rose from $891,823 in 1965 to $967,419 in 1966. See NLADA, 1966
SUMMARY

OF

CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

46; NLADA, 1967

SUMMARY

OF CONFERENCE

275. I have been unable to locate information on subsequent years. From what
I know of the OEO programs, however, my guess is that the value of lawyer contributions
PROCEEDINGS

continued to grow. Many private practitioners previously uninterested in the work of pre-

OEO legal aid offices were stimulated by the stress placed upon legal reform by various OEO
offices and as a result contributed their services.
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services to those unable to afford them. Most lawyers probably do
not contribute their services to the poor. Tucker does more than
state this as a fact, however. She presents it as a moral indictment."
She proclaims, for example, that "only a handful of exceptional
attorneys are attempting to meet the vast needs of the public and
to atone for the general failure of the bar to service the non-rich
public."" Is the immorality of the bar's behavior self-evident, as
Tucker's presentation implies? Tucker's position rests on the assumption that lawyers have a moral obligation to pay the costs of
providing legal services for the poor. This assumption needs to be
examined.
Insofar as the general public is morally bound to make charitable contributions toward the welfare of the poor, lawyers, too,
should be considered bound. Lawyers, then, would be subject to
criticism if they had failed to contribute their proportionate share.
Tucker makes no such claim, and the available evidence suggests
the contrary. 7 Since legal services are involved, however, is it arguable that the moral responsibility of the bar for charitable works is
greater than the obligation of the general public? This argument
would be valid if producers generally were considered to have a
special moral obligation to pay the costs of making their goods and
services available to the poor. However, no such principle has been
adopted by our society. Grocery store owners and home builders, for
example, have no greater duty than the rest of us to see that food
and shelter are made available to the poor. Why should lawyers be
judged by a special moral standard? Tucker does not answer this
question; indeed, she does not even make the reader aware of it.
Whether lawyers are blameworthy for not voluntarily taking
care of the poor is a different question from whether society by law
ought to impose some special obligation on the bar. Tucker advocates such a law. 8 Her main argument-that we should enforce the
moral obligation of lawyers-has already been discussed. She alludes to a second rationale in the following sentence: "[G]iven the
fact that only lawyers can practice law, the public, at whose suffer55. Were Tucker simply asserting that lawyers are not extraordinarily noble, I would
agree. Although this absence of special virtue might be reason for lament, it hardly is a basis
for condemning the bar. Tucker does condemn; she depicts the bar as ignoble, venal, and base
rather than as having no greater nobility than people generally.
56. Tucker, supra note 49, at 26-27 (emphasis added).
57. See notes 53 & 54 supra and accompanying text.
58. Tucker, supra note 49, at 28. Tucker does not use the word "law," but this is clearly
what she means.
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ance this monopoly exists, can demand its quid pro quo."'59 This
quick reference to "monopoly" with all that term implies is hardly
a responsible way to present a difficult, complex matter. Here, in
brief, are some of the questions involved. Rules allowing only lawyers to perform certain tasks probably prevent nonlawyers from
providing seemingly comparable services at a price that would be
lower than lawyers' fees. It may be that these rules are maintained
by lawyers for the purpose of enhancing their income; if so, it would
be reasonable to say that lawyers are realizing monopoly profits, and
it might be appropriate for society to demand that the bar provide
free services for the poor. However, if the rules in question exist at
the sufferance of the public, as Tucker says, it is unlikely that this
sufferance is extended in order to provide economic benefits for
lawyers. The more likely explanation is that the public wants and
is willing to pay for the assurance of quality that it associates with
having lawyers rather than laypersons perform certain tasks. If this
is true, the impact of licensing rules on legal fees would not be unfair
and, therefore, would not provide a rationale for requiring lawyers
to bear the costs of legal services for the poor.
In two essays Mark Green, the co-editor of Verdicts on Lawyers,
attacks both the ABA"0 and the "economic excesses" of lawyers.'
Viewed in isolation and stated with appropriate qualifications, some
of Green's points would be well taken. These specific points, however, are only details in the picture he draws of the bar and lawyers,
a picture that in its overall effect is deceptive and misleading. For
example, he evaluates the ABA by implicitly asking whether its
actions are in the public interest and then proceeds to show that
they are not.12 Although the bar sometimes exaggerates its dedica59. Id. at 27.
60. Green, Trade Association, supra note 49, at 3-19.
61. Green, Legal Product, supra note 49, at 63-79.
62. One aspect of Green's criticism is that ABA sections in various areas of the
law-antitrust, taxation, and the like-are self-serving because their legislative proposals are
biased in favor of the interests of large business clients represented by the lawyers who belong
to these Sections. If the legislative proposals really had been untenable from a disinterested
viewpoint, then the Sections would be subject to criticism. If the difficulty is only that the
proposals of the ABA Sections appear objectionable to Green and others with strong convictions on the issues in question, then the Sections ought not be criticized for making those
proposals. The proposals themselves, of course, would be the proper subjects of the criticism.
I know too little about issues and proposals that Green discusses to form a judgment about
this matter. Another reviewer of Verdicts on Lawyers, who is quite knowledgeable in the area
of patent law, says the following of Green's comments on the work of the ABA Section on
Patents, Trademark and Copyright Law: "It is indeed unfortunate that facts and reason take
a back seat to unsupported allegation." Davidson, Book Review, 6 U. BALT. L. REv. 195, 198
(1976).
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tion to the public interest, I do not think it pretends to be unconcerned with its own interests, and such altruism should not be expected. Thus the standard by which Green appraises the bar is
inappropriate. In addition, whether the ABA conduct Green cites as
narrowly self-interested ought to be so characterized is at least questionable. For example, he attributes the ABA's position on no-fault
liability insurance proposals solely to the bar's pursuit of economic
self-interest. 3 I do not doubt that self-interest was a factor, but the
picture Green draws distorts the truth. He treats the ABA's 1969
position-that, in principle, liability should fall on the person whose
conduct was wrongful-as if it were absurd, 4 but neglects to mention that many people with no economic stake in the matter agreed
with that view.65 In 1972, he notes, the ABA "declared itself
'opposed to any federal no-fault' insurance legislation." 6 As ABA
reports show, this opposition was directed at federal action, not at
state legislation.67 The rationale for this distinction, of course, is
that society will benefit from experimentation at the state level.66
Lay readers, however, are unlikely to see or to understand the shift
in the ABA's position, and Green does nothing to help them.
Over the years the ABA has taken many positions on national
and international issues, positions with which many persons, myself
included, have disagreed. Green recites a long list of these positions,
including: opposition to the Sherman Antitrust Act, the income tax
amendment, Roosevelt's New Deal legislation, and to United States
ratification of the Genocide Convention; its militant anticommunism during the 1950's; its failure to adopt a resolution calling for
United States withdrawal from Vietnam. 9 Presumably these are
63. Green, Trade Association, supra note 49, at 7-8.
64. Id. at 8.
65. See, e.g., W. BLum & H. KALVEN, PuBUc LAw PERSPECTVE ON A PvATE LAW
PROBLEM: AuTO COMPENSATION PLANS 8-15 (1965); Kalven, Plan'sPhilosophyStrikes at Heart
of Tort Concept, 3 TaL 35, 36 (Oct./Nov. 1967).
66. Green, Trade Association, supra note 49, at 8.
67. The proposal adopted by the ABA House of Delegates reads as follows: "That the
American Bar Association is opposed to any federal 'no fault' insurance legislation and believes that any changes which may be made in the so-called automobile accident reparations
system should be by state action." 97 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ABA 542 (1972).
68. We are unalterably opposed to legislation now pending in the United States
Congress which would pre-empt state motor vehicle accident reparation reform by the
establishment of a federal law. . .. Rather, we are in accord with the Department of
Transportation that state experimentation with diverse motor vehicle reparation plans
offers the best solution to the development of meaningful reform in the public interest.
Report of Special Committee on Automobile InsuranceLegislation, in 97 ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE ABA 725, 727 (1972).
69. Green, Trade Association, supra note 49, at 4-5, 15-17.
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cited to illustrate the ABA's lack of concern for the public interest.
All that really is demonstrated, however, is that the ABA's conception of the public interest differs from Green's (and mine). This
hardly constitutes a valid ground for implying that the ABA has
disregarded its responsibility to the public.
The basic theme of Green's second essay7" seems to be that
lawyers, especially business lawyers, charge excessive fees and earn
exorbitant incomes. Early in this essay, after noting that "the top
lawyer's income in Connecticut in 1789 was only $2000," that less
than a third of Philadelphia's lawyers were self-supporting in the
1880's, and so on, Green states that the "last decade . . . has seen
an explosion in the earnings of lawyers." The apparent implication
of this comparison is that the incomes lawyers earn today are too
high. Without other information, however, there is no basis for this
conclusion. Moreover, his characterization of recent developments
as an "explosion" in the income of lawyers is dubious. The term
"explosion" suggests that lawyers have done especially well. In fact,
though Green does not mention this, the income of lawyers during
the period in question increased only a bit more rapidly than the
gross national product; compared with other professionals, lawyers
did worse than some but better than others. 72 As further evidence
70. Green, Legal Product, supra note 49, at 63-79.
71. Id. at 64. In the same passage, Green notes that
[i]n the Bible Aaron spoke on behalf of Moses, yet there is no record of receipt of even
a minimum fee. Under the Teachings of Confucius. . .people in government gave legal
advice but were prohibited from taking money for doing so. The Cincian law of ancient
Rome in 200 B.C. forbade advocates to charge any fees ....
Id. at 63-64. The innuendo of this history summary is that contemporary lawyers are at fault
because they charge substantial fees. In this manner Green conveys an idea without explicitly
stating and defending it. This technique occurs throughout his two essays in Verdicts on
Lawyers.
72. Although Green speaks of an "explosion" during the "last decade," he gives no
figures for that period. The most recent figures are for 1966 and 1972, the last year for which
he cites data. Green's figure for the gross income of lawyers in 1966 is mistaken. The reference
he cites is "Internal Revenue Service, Business Income Tax Returns (1973), at 13, 25," but
his 1966 figure is not found there. I have checked various other possible sources but can find
no source for his figure. Indeed, the Treasury publication to which he refers contains quite a
different figure. Fortunately, his figure for 1972 is correct.
Comparison of lawyers' incomes with those of other professionals is not simple. Income
data are reported in two sections in Business Income Tax Returns, one for proprietorships
and one for partnerships, and these must be summed to determine total income. If one sums
the figures in the "net profit" columns, the comparison of one profession's total "net profit"
with another's is dubious because (a) the meaning of "net profit" in the proprietorship section
is significantly different than in the section on partnerships and (b) the proportions of practitioners doing business as proprietorships and partnerships differ greatly from one profession
to another. Fortunately, the figures for "business receipts" are computed in the same way
for proprietorships and partnerships and thus provide a valid basis for comparing professions.
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that lawyers make too much money, Green recites the hourly rates
charged by large corporate law firms, the incomes of some top partners, and some of the fees paid by clients. 73 Readers might conclude
that because these figures are large, they therefore are excessive.
Green encourages this conclusion by ignoring the possibility that
fees are reasonably related to the cost and value of the services
rendered. He suggests instead that fees are high because large corporations are unconcerned with their legal costs. 74 As proof of this
thesis, he offers only this statement by an unnamed District of
Columbia lawyer: " 'There are so many zeros on the ends of the
problems clients have,' . . . that 'when they're dealing in a $50
million business, what do they care about the fee?' ,,7The quotation, as he notes, is from a feature story in the Washington Post.78
In the same story, just a few lines above the passage quoted, is the
following observation, which Green ignores: "What does the Washington lawyer do to earn this kind of money? Even Ralph Nader
'77
admits they work hard and long hours.
A third fundamentally deficient essay is Alan Morrison's attack
on government attorneys, "Defending the Government: How Vigorous is Too Vigorous?" 7 The author's thesis is simple: (a) there are
"limits on the behavior of a government attorney defending federal
officials in a civil lawsuit. Here a lawyer is not merely a client
instrument but a public servant. . .. When the government attorney raises a defense which in effect tells the citizen, "the agency
"Business receipts" refers to gross income. In any particular profession, however, the relationship between gross and net earnings presumably is much the same from year to year. Using
"business receipts," therefore, should result in an accurate picture of how growth in the net
earnings in one profession compares with growth in others.
In the period 1966 to 1972, the income (business receipts) of lawyers grew by 61%. The
gross national product went up 55%. The increase in income in other professions was as
follows: accounting, 94%; education, 81%; dentistry, 61%; physicians and surgeons, architects, and engineers, approximately 25%. These percentage increases in business receipts were
calculated from data in the United States Treasury Department's annual publication,
Statistics of Income-U.S. Business Tax Returns. See U.S. TREAsuRy DEPr. (IRS), 1966
BusiNEss TAX RETURNS 30, 124 (1969); U.S. TREAsURY DmEr. (IRS), 1972 BusiNEss TAx
RETufRs 9, 86 (1976). For figures on gross national product, see U.S. CENsus BUREAu, 1974
STAnSTncAL AsSTAr 373 (GNP for 1972); U.S. CENsus ButEu, 1968 STATSTIcAL ABSTAcr
312 (GNP for 1966).
73. Green, Legal Product,supra note 49, at 72-75.
74. Green's assumption is revealed by the following: "Why are billings so high? A
lawyer doesn't have to be told in law school that you can charge a client worth $400 million
more than one earning $400,000 a year." Id. at 74.
75. Id.
76. Washington Post, Dec. 26, 1973, § A, at 1, 6.
77. Id.

78.

Morrison, Defending the Government: How Vigorous Is Too Vigorous?, in VERVicrs,

supra note 2, at 242-52.
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may be breaking the law, but the court can't do anything about it,"
it is difficult to understand how the oath to "uphold and defend the
Constitution and laws of the United States" is being fulfilled[;" 7"
(b) government lawyers frequently assert the defenses of lack of
standing to sue, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and sovereign
immunity, which, if successful, prevent adjudication on the merits;
(c) therefore government attorneys frequently have violated their
ethical and moral responsibilities.
It is generally agreed that lawyers ought not raise frivolous
defenses"0 and equally well understood that lawyers, including those
who defend the government, sometimes do. If Morrison were making
only this point, his essay would be unobjectionable. He goes further,
however. He claims that it is morally wrong to "assert defenses that
preclude or delay important questions from being decided on the
merits." 8' Since he says that the defenses in question ought not be
raised even if they would preclude adjudication on the merits and
since preclusion would usually occur only if the defense asserted
were valid, Morrison's position is that even valid claims of sovereign
immunity, lack of standing, and lack of subject matter jurisdiction
should not be made. The central assumption underlying this view
is that these defenses involve little or nothing of importance. That
position may or may not be defensible. It is indefensible, however,
to present this assumption to an untutored lay audience as a selfevident truth without even a hint that significant social policies
underlie these defenses. That, however, is exactly what Morrison
does. He completely ignores the policies involved and by direct
statement and innuendo characterizes these defenses as legal technicalities, mere lawyers' tricks with no substance behind them. In
a passage on sovereign immunity, he implies that the United States
Supreme Court has held this defense invalid,82 which, of course, is
contrary to fact. The objection that a plaintiff lacks standing, he
says, "is deployed to avoid deciding troubling cases, and becomes
79.

Id. at 242.

80. See CouNTYMAN, supra note 13, at 255-67.
81. Morrison, supra note 78, at 251.
82. After quoting from a case in which a specific claim of sovereign immunity was
rejected, Morrison proceeds as follows:
Government attorneys nonetheless continue to raise the defense of sovereign immunity,
ignoring the counsel of Henry Friendly, another former chief judge of the second circuit,
that "law officers of the Government ought not to take the time of busy judges or of
opposing parties by advancing an argument so plainly foreclosed by Supreme Court
decisions."
Id. at 245.
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the defense of 'go mind your own business,'
jurisdiction is a "legal rubric.
someplace else.' "84

. .

"" while

subject matter

with its English translation of 'go

I have no doubt that government lawyers, no less than others,
sometimes harass their opponents by defending on dubious grounds.
These tactics are dishonest, violate both ethical and legal norms,
and should be exposed to public view. Nothing I have said should
be taken as condoning or defending them. The failings of government lawyers, however, are no excuse for irresponsibility on the part
of their critics.
IV.
There are many more examples of the shortcomings I find in
Verdicts on Lawyers. At this point, however, I would like to move
to a different though kindred matter.
For me, the most pervasive characteristic of Verdicts on
Lawyers is its antipathy toward lawyers and legal institutions. Why
is this so? Perhaps the answer is that those who produced this book
see lawyers and the law as part of a society they consider to be
fundamentally corrupt and indecent. This would be ironic, however,
since the editors and most of the authors are lawyers themselves.
Surely they would not have chosen this calling had they always held
it in such low regard. Indeed, it seems likely that at some point in
their lives they looked up to lawyers. Is this the key? Are their
present attitudes a reaction to an earlier idealization of the legal
profession? Perhaps these writer-lawyers came to the law expecting
the bar to be superhuman, especially selfless, public spirited,
reform-minded, and otherwise more noble than humankind in general. If so, they surely have been disappointed and frustrated, and
this may account for their apparent anger. Lawyers, after all, are
neither better nor worse than other human beings, and it is time we
accept and acknowledge this. Until we do, we will neither understand the shortcomings of our profession nor be able to think intelligently about how to improve it.
This suggests a final thought. In one respect, this review of
Verdicts on Lawyers may be too harsh. Not that the essays are any
better than I have indicated. Insofar as I have cast blame on the
editors and authors, however, perhaps that is unfair. For what I
have said about lawyers is no less true of individuals devoted to
83. Id. at 243.
84. Id. at 244.
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social reform. They, too, are only human and when matters close to
their hearts are involved, it may be too much to expect them to live
by the principles they espouse.

